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Summary
The promulgation of the Jurisdiction of the Regional Courts Amendment Act, 31 of 2008 
(hereafter the JRCAA) in 62 large urban magisterial districts on 9 August 2010 (Women’s 
Day) heralds a potentially drastic transformation of the practice of civil procedure in 
South Africa. This article focuses on its implications for family law and, especially, child 
law proceedings. The various dimensions of jurisdictional reform are first explained with 
reference to the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 and the JRCAA, whereafter their import is 
analysed. It will be questioned whether the provisions of the JRCAA were drafted with 
sufficient care, and why no reference was made to the provisions of the Children’s 
Act 38 of 2005. The potential difficulties occasioned by the new jurisdictional rules will 
be described. In conclusion, comments are made about the positive and less positive 
aspects of the JRCAA, and suggestions for reform are provided.
Die Jurisdiction of the Regional Courts Amendment Act, 2008: 
Gevolge vir kinderreg en egskeiding jurisdiksie
Die inwerkingtreding van die Jurisdiction of Regional Courts Amendment Act, 31 van 
2008 (voortaan die JRCAA), in 62 groot stedelike landdrosdistrikte op 9 Augustus 
2010 (Vrouedag), het die potensiaal vir drastiese transformasie van die praktyk van 
siviele prosesreg in Suid-Afrika. Hierdie artikel fokus op die implikasies van die Wet 
vir familiereg, en in besonder, kindderreg verrigtinge. Die verskillende afmetings 
van die jurisdiksionele hervormings word eerstens beskryf met verwysing na die 
Kinderwet, 38 van 2005 en die JRCAA, waarna hulle mening geanaliseer word. Dit 
word bevraagteken of die JRCAA bepalings met genoeg sorg geformuleer was, en 
hoekom geen verwysing na die Kinderwet verskyn. Die moontlike probleem wat die 
nuwe jurisdiksionele bepalings mag veroorsaak word beskryf. Gevolglik word daar 
kommentaar gelewer oor die positiewe and minder positiewe aspekte van die JRCAA, 
en voorstelle vir hervorming word aanbeveel. 
J Sloth-Nielsen, University of the Western Cape. An earlier version of this 
paper was presented at a Family Law Colloquium held at the University of the 
Western Cape on 23 September 2010.
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1. Introduction
The promulgation of the Jurisdiction of the Regional Courts Amendment Act, 
31 of 2008 (hereafter the JRCAA) in 62 large urban magisterial districts on 9 
August 2010 (Women’s Day) heralds a potentially drastic transformation of the 
practice of civil procedure in South Africa. It has also explicitly been enacted 
as part of the various efforts to transform the judiciary and the practice of 
law in South Africa.1 This is because the Act first seeks to imbue Regional 
Courts, which hitherto have enjoyed only criminal jurisdiction, with civil 
jurisdiction, thereby equipping presiding officers in these courts to ‘compete’ 
with practitioners from private practice for judicial appointment, since Regional 
Court magistrates will presumably in future have acquired the necessary civil 
court experience to be eligible for judicial appointment.2
However, this article focuses on the second stated objective of the JRCAA, 
namely to further access to justice by rendering High Court applications 
justiciable in Regional Courts. For the present discussion, the focus is on 
family law and, especially, child law proceedings. The various dimensions of 
jurisdictional reform are first explained with reference to the Children’s Act 
38 of 2005 and the JRCAA, whereafter their import is analysed. It will be 
questioned whether the provisions of the JRCAA were drafted with sufficient 
care, and why no reference was made to the provisions of the Children’s Act 38 
of 2005. The potential difficulties occasioned by the new jurisdictional rules will 
be described. In conclusion, comments are made about the positive and less 
positive aspects of the JRCAA, and suggestions for reform are provided.
2. Background to the Family Court pilot projects and  
 the development of the jurisdictional provisions of the  
 Children’s Act 38 of 2005
Jurisdiction was a highly contested feature of the development of the Children’s 
Act. The intention of the South African Law Reform Commission (hereafter 
SALRC) was to broaden access to justice, without unduly compromising 
expertise, or treating all matters as equally complex. Much of the SALRC’s 
investigation was undertaken at a very fluid time in the history of child and family 
law developments. It will be recalled that the pilot Family Court programme had 
been initiated in the latter part of the 1990s, overtly to deal with the need to de-
racialise the old ‘black divorce’ courts.3 The pilot Family Courts were instituted 
in six magisterial districts in late 1998,4 and enjoyed the same geographical 
jurisdiction of the former ‘black divorce’ courts, i.e. as established under 
1 At the time of writing, the Legal Practice Bill 2010 still awaits parliamentary debate 
after originally being tabled in 2000.
2 This is explicitly detailed in the Preamble setting out the purposes of the 
Amendment Act, viz. “to promote the development of judicial expertise among the 
ranks of magistrates with the view to broadening the pool of fit and proper persons 
qualifying for appointment to the superior courts”.
3 Budlender 1998; Burman et al. 2000.
4 Budlender 1998.
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the Black Administration Act 9 of 1929. This jurisdiction had not in any way 
been similar to the geographical jurisdiction of the Regional Courts, instead 
being divided into circuits (Southern Divorce Court, North Eastern Divorce 
Court, and the Central Divorce Court) which crossed provinces, and dealt 
with the resolution of matters arising from customary law disputes.5 The pilot 
Family Courts adopted the same geographical jurisdiction as the former black 
divorce courts; in some areas, related family law courts were ‘clustered’ in an 
attempt to provide a more coherent family law service. Examples included 
maintenance courts and courts dealing with domestic violence, which were 
situated in close proximity to the new pilot Family Courts.
Despite what seemed to be a promising start towards a unified family court 
jurisdiction to be tested in the pilot Family Courts, without clear direction or 
resources from the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, 
they soon became marginalised from broader family and child law trends. 
Early academic studies ceased, and practitioner interest and support dwindled 
as the understaffed and, in their view, inexperienced, personnel struggled to 
deal with family law practice for the poor family law litigants who could not 
afford the more pricy justice of the High Courts, or who were not prepared to 
wait lengthy periods for trials in High Courts.
At the same time, a ‘proper’ Family Court was under discussion. A Family 
Court Task team was established, and this team met for some years before 
it disappeared when it lost the political goodwill of the Department. Rules of 
procedure, which were expected, a blueprint for family court specialisation, 
which was rumoured to be under development, and the rewriting of the Divorce 
Act did not occur, although these had been mooted during the life of the Family 
Court Task team.6 All these practice developments were occurring while the 
review of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 was underway, as described next.
A Project Committee of the SALRC had been established to effect the 
review of the Child Care Act in 1997, and after releasing an Issue Paper in 
1998, in which the scope of the investigation was set out, the Project Committee 
completed the major Discussion Paper on the Review of the Children’s Act in 
2000. The uncertainty concerning the future of family courts, and jurisdiction 
in the sphere of family law, in general, left the SALRC unclear as to how 
to proceed for much of the tenure of the Project Committee. Ultimately, it 
became clear that a well-resourced and expert family court model was not 
going to emerge from other quarters, and that the SALRC would have to forge 
ahead and propose its own blueprint for those aspects of family law which fell 
within its mandate, i.e. the law relating to children.
Indeed, the uncertainty that had prevailed is evident throughout various 
parts of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 that has now been adopted, insofar as 
the Act periodically refers to ‘a divorce court’, which at the time was a non-
existent legal entity. In this regard the following sections can be cited:
5 Skelton 2009; Carnelly et al. 2010:337.
6 Chaskalson and De Jong 2002.
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Section 22(4)(b) – Subject to subsection (6), a parental responsibilities 
and rights agreement takes effect only if (a) registered with the family 
advocate; or (b) made an order of the High Court, a divorce court in a 
divorce matter or the children’s court on application by the parties to 
the agreement.
Section 23(1) – Any person having an interest in the care, well-being 
or development of a child may apply to the High Court, a divorce court 
in divorce matters or the children’s court for an order granting to the 
applicant, on such conditions as the court may deem necessary – (a) 
contact with the child; or (b) care of the child.
Section 28(1) – A person referred to in subsection (3) may apply to 
the High Court, a divorce court in a divorce matter or a children’s court 
for an order- (a) suspending for a period, or terminating, any or all of 
the parental responsibilities and rights which a specific person has in 
respect of a child; or (b) extending or circumscribing the exercise by 
that person of any or all of the parental responsibilities and rights that 
person has in respect of a child.
Section 29(1) – An application in terms of section 22 (4) (b), 23, 24, 26 
(1) (b) or 28 may be brought before the High Court, a divorce court in a 
divorce matter or a children’s court, as the case may be, within whose 
area of jurisdiction the child concerned is ordinarily resident.
Section 45(3) – pending the establishment of Family Courts by an Act of 
Parliament, High Courts and Divorce courts7 have exclusive jurisdiction 
in the listed matters.8
The words ‘divorce court’ were also expressly defined in section 1 of the 
Children’s Act as “the divorce court established in terms of section 10 of the 
Administration Amendment Act, 1929 (Act 9 of 1929).”
Due to the prevailing uncertain future direction, the SALRC initially proposed 
a model which can really be described as an interim solution. Divorce, division 
of matrimonial property, and spousal maintenance fell, naturally, outside the 
mandate of this specific investigation. Therefore, the proposals were confined 
to those aspects of child law that could be ‘divorced’ from divorce.
Whereas the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 had provided for children’s courts 
to be based at district court level (and every magistrate’s court was designated 
also as a children’s court), the SALRC model suggested the introduction of a 
two-tier system of ‘child and family courts’, to be located at both magisterial 
7 In this section, ‘Divorce Courts’ are spelt with a capital letter in the text of the 
Children’s Act.
8 The listed matters relate to “the guardianship of the child; the assignment, exercise, 
extension, restriction, suspension or termination of guardianship in respect of a 
child; artificial insemination; the departure, removal or abduction of a child from the 
Republic; applications requiring the return of a child to the Republic from abroad; 
the age of majority or the contractual or legal capacity of a child; the safeguarding 
of a child’s interest in property; and surrogate motherhood.”
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and regional court level.9 It was clarified that the children’s court would be a 
court at district level, in view of its accessibility (geographically and financially) 
to Joe Public, and in view of the existing infrastructure at magisterial district 
level, not to mention the historical role that children’s courts at every magisterial 
district have played since their introduction in 1937.
However, the idea of a role for the court at the second (superior) level 
was novel. It was proposed that jurisdiction at this secondary level would be 
reserved for more complex matters, as well as for appeals from the lower 
courts. The court at second level, to be called a child and family regional court, 
would mirror the geographical jurisdiction of the regional (criminal) courts, but 
with exclusive (civil) jurisdiction conferred by the proposed Children’s Act. In 
time, this court could become the specialised family court that had initially 
been proposed by the Hoexter Commission of Inquiry into the Structure 
and Functioning of the Courts in the 1980s. As regards the choice of first or 
second tier court as a court of first instance, it was proposed that a sifting 
process, to be fulfilled by admission clerks, would ensure that more complex 
matters entered the system at the second level as matters of first instance – a 
modified form of specialised Regional Court dedicated to child law matters – 
and that less complex matters would be channelled to the children’s courts at 
magistrate’s court level in the first instance. In addition, it was proposed that the 
present jurisdiction of the High Courts in matters relating to child law (including 
guardianship and all other dimensions of parental rights and responsibilities) 
be abrogated altogether: that is, the High Court would not be a competent 
court of first instance in any matter related to children, including guardianship. 
This was intentional: the High Court’s singular expertise as ‘upper guardians’ 
of all children within their area of jurisdiction was disbelieved, and it had been 
demonstrated that High Courts were inaccessible and expensive fora which 
led to a denial of rights.10
Therefore, settling on the (revamped) children’s courts as the first 
avenue for dispute resolution and adjudication, as well as for the fulfilment 
of the primary functions related to adoption, placement in foster care, welfare 
enquiries into children’s care and protection needs, and so forth, the SALRC 
then drafted a vastly revamped role for the children’s court, expanding not 
only its jurisdictional competence but also the array of interventions, orders 
and functions it would fulfil. Much of this latter line of reasoning has survived 
the parliamentary process, and produced a series of new functions and 
capabilities for children’s courts. A full discussion lies beyond the scope of 
this article.11
But the core jurisdictional proposals of the SALRC changed shape and 
hue quite dramatically even before the parliamentary process which led to 
the finalisation of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005.12 In fact, the first round of 
amendments was effected by the Department of Social Development before 
9 SALC Project 110 Discussion Paper on the Review of the Child Care Act 2001:1154-
1156 and SALC Project 110 Report on the Review of the Child Care Act 2002.
10 SALRC Report on the Review of the Child Care Act 2002 vol. 2:307-309.
11 Gallinetti 2007:4-11; Skelton and Proudlock 2007:1-14 in general.
12 See Skelton and Proudlock 2007 for a brief overview.
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the Bill produced by the SALRC entered the parliamentary process. As regards 
main characteristics of the changes brought about to the SALRC proposals, 
first, the two-tier court structure, which in effect sought to create a ‘regional 
level’ jurisdiction in child law matters, was dropped. In its stead, a single tier 
system for all matters related to the Act, irrespective of complexity or nature, 
was promoted, and this would comprise, as in the past, the children’s court 
situated at magistrate’s court level. (As mentioned, the extended role, functions 
and, above all, powers of the children’s court remained more or less intact, 
however.) Reportedly, the objections to the two-tier structure were raised by 
the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development.
Secondly, the ongoing lack of progress, by that stage indicative of a 
complete policy failure, relating to the development of the pilot Family Courts 
as a means of transforming the black divorce courts (as they were widely 
known), left the legislator with little choice but to retain the references to High 
Courts as well as the mentioned description of ‘divorce courts’. This was in 
lieu of the ideal, which was to remove High Court jurisdiction altogether in 
children’s matters, including those incidental to parental separation. This 
position pertains in the Children’s Act that was finally passed.
Thirdly, a direct intervention during the parliamentary process before the 
Portfolio Committee of Social Development by the Portfolio Committee on 
Justice and Constitutional Development saw a hard-line stance being taken 
on the proposed dilution (or elimination) of High Court role in the jurisdictional 
conundrum. The retention of guardianship as the exclusive preserve of the 
High Court was the result of this. The logic and reasoning of this insistence 
are none too clear, other than the argument that guardianship matters involve 
(at times) status-changing events such as marriage, or removal of the child 
from the Republic, or encumbrance and alienation of the child’s property – and 
that these matters are too ‘serious’ to be dealt with by a lower court (a mere 
creature of statute). Civil society objected rigorously against the illogical13 and 
confusing position, but to no avail.
Now, a schizophrenic position prevails. This rests to a large extent on the 
interplay between the following sections:
Section 1(4) which reads that “any proceedings arising out of the •	
application of the Administration Amendment Act 9 of 1929, the Divorce 
Act, the Maintenance Act, the Domestic Violence Act 166 of 1998 and the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, 1998 (Act 120 of 1998) insofar 
as these Acts relate to children, may not be dealt with in the children’s 
court”.14 (This section was evidently inserted while the Bill was discussed 
in Parliament, at the insistence of the Justice sector). This section 
13 Illogical, given the fact that the children’s court is empowered to perform comparably 
drastic steps in relation to parental powers such as the complete severance thereof 
when approving an adoption.
14 Note that the lack of reference to Act numbers and the year of passage in respect 
of the Divorce Act and the Maintenance Act are reproduced from the original 
of section 1(4) of the Children’s Act. Other Acts referred to in this section bear 
numbers and dates.
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appears to underscore the position that divorce (including those aspects 
relating to the allocation of parental responsibilities for children), domestic 
violence (for which dedicated courts are also in operation), and recovery 
of maintenance (similarly, separate courts exist for applications under the 
Maintenance Act 99 of 1998) do not fall within the remit of the children’s 
court, even if the wide powers accorded this court in Chapter 4 suggest 
otherwise.15
Section 22(7) which provides that only a High Court may confirm, amend •	
or terminate a parental responsibilities and rights agreement that relates 
to guardianship of a child.
Section 24(1) which states that “any person having an interest in the care, •	
well-being and development of a child may apply to the High Court” for an 
order granting guardianship to the applicant.
Section 29, which provides for the jurisdiction of the court, including High •	
Courts, being founded in the court in whose jurisdictional area the child 
is ordinarily resident.
Section 45(3) (placed in the children’s court chapter) which confirms, in •	
what purports to be plain language, the exclusive jurisdiction of the High 
Courts AND divorce courts over eight listed legal issues, starting with 
guardianship, pending the establishment of family courts by an Act of 
Parliament.16
The schizophrenic position that emerges from the above position lies in 
the fact that most matters affecting parental responsibilities and rights are 
in contradictory fashion accorded children’s courts and, at the same time, 
some are reserved exclusively for other courts. Section 1(4) is especially 
problematic insofar as it purports to bar a children’s court from dealing with 
domestic violence and maintenance, which are crucial issues in the sphere of 
child care and protection.
3. The JRCAA
The new jurisdiction of the Regional Courts is rather inelegantly set out in the 
JRCAA. The JRCAA repeals the Administration Amendment Act 9 of 1929, the 
Act which had formerly established ‘Black Administration Courts’ and which 
15 It is notable, perhaps, that the courts referred to in section 1(4) fall under the 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. The children’s court is 
something of a hybrid: staffed by magistrates, children’s courts have from time to 
time been regarded as ‘belonging’ to Social Development. This became manifest 
when the amendments effected to the Child Care Act 74/1983 in 1996 to give effect 
to children’s constitutional right to legal representation in the children’s court was 
ultimately never promulgated, due to a dispute between Departments about which 
Department would bear the costs of such legal representation.
16 It is suggested that the introduction of the JRCAA does not ‘establish family courts 
by an Act of Parliament’ as provided for in the Children’s Act, and cannot be 
construed as fulfilling the suspensive condition in the Children’s Act created by 
section 45(3). See section 5 below for further discussion of this aspect.
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had been responsible for segregated justice in respect of a range of divorce 
disputes and in legal matters related to the administration of deceased estates 
of Black persons.17 The need to dispense finally with racially segregated courts 
cannot be faulted.
Of relevance to this discussion is section 29(1B) of the JRCAA18 which 
provides as follows, amending section 29 of the Magistrates’ Court Act, 1944:19
(1B) (a) A court for a regional division, in respect of causes of action, 
shall, subject to section 28(1A), have jurisdiction to hear and determine 
suits relating to the nullity of a marriage or a civil union and relating 
to divorce between persons and to decide upon any question arising 
therefrom, and to hear any matter and grant any order provided for in 
terms of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, 1998 (Act No. 
120 of 1998).
(b) A court for a regional division hearing a matter referred to paragraph 
(a) shall have the same jurisdiction as any High Court in relation to 
such a matter.
In the transitional provisions (section 9 of the JRCAA), it is made clear that 
the old ‘black divorce courts’ set up under the Black Administration Act, 1929 
(subsequently the Administration Amendment Act), are no more: they now 
become ‘a court of the regional division designated by the Minister’. Officers 
of such courts are now also holders of the rank of magistrate of the regional 
division. Any reference in any law to a ‘divorce court’ is, according to section 
9(5), “deemed to be a reference to a court of a regional division”.
The first question that arises is precisely which legal matters are affected 
by the ‘extension of regional court jurisdiction’. For this, the wording (ipsissima 
verba) of the quoted section is the first point of departure: it refers to nullity of 
marriages and civil unions, divorce between persons and decisions from any 
questions there from. Any order possible under the Recognition of Customary 
Marriages Act (RCMA) (including those related to matrimonial property 
regimes whether upon dissolution of a marriage or not) are obviously included 
by the express wording of the section.
Divorce ordinarily refers to the act of dissolution of the marriage between 
the adult parties. The Divorce Act 70 of 1979 does not define divorce. However, 
‘divorce action’ is defined in the Divorce Act to mean in the first instance an 
“action by which a decree of divorce or other relief in connection therewith 
17 Moseneke and ors v Master of the High Court and ors 2001 (2) BCLR 103 (CC).
18 The extension (creation?) of a Regional Courts’ civil jurisdiction in matters sounding 
in money in claims to the value of R300.000 is also substantially affected by the 
JRCAA. However, the relevant provisions and their effect will not be dealt with in 
this article.
19 The new subsection (d) provides that: “Any person who has been appointed as 
a Family Advocate or Family Counsellor under the Mediation in Certain Divorce 
Matters Act, 1987 (Act No. 24 of 1987), shall be deemed to have also been 
appointed in respect of any court for a regional division having jurisdiction in the 
area for which he or she has been so appointed”.
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is applied for”.20 What this relief may comprise is not spelt out. Admittedly, 
the definition of ‘divorce action’ continues to include “an application pendente 
lite for an interdict or for the interim custody or for access to a minor child of 
the marriage concerned or for the payment of maintenance”. But note the 
reference to interim custody or access which forms part of this definition. The 
crisp question is whether the finalisation of custody or access (as they were 
termed before the parental responsibilities and rights regime of the Children’s 
Act 58 of 2005 gained the force of law) is necessarily or by implication part of 
a divorce action.
Shafer’s Family Law Service argues that a divorce action includes not only 
the decree of divorce or other ancillary relief in connection therewith but also 
applications pendente lite for an interdict, maintenance or for the custody of 
(care) or access to (contact with) the minor child.21 Schafer does not appear 
to make anything of the word “interim” which is contained in the wording of the 
Divorce Act regarding the meaning of a divorce action. Nor do Van Heerden 
et al. address this point.22
De Jong clearly implies that final decisions concerning the division of 
parental responsibilities and rights are part and parcel of the divorce order, 
and argues this from the perspective of the protection of the rights of the 
child.23 In the context of her discussion of a purported ‘divorce’ of ‘divorce’ 
from the allocation of parental responsibilities and rights, a decision in which 
the child’s right to contact was left altogether unresolved and to be dealt with 
at a later stage, thus compromising the best interests of the child, this ab 
initio stance may seem to make sense.24 Certainly this is how for decades the 
South African family law practice has functioned, treating the finalisation of 
parental rights and responsibilities allocations as part and parcel of divorce, 
to be effected by the High Court having jurisdiction. While this may be in the 
children’s best interests generally, it is submitted that it is not always in the 
best interests of children that parental rights and responsibilities be tied to 
disputes about other aspects of the divorce, and that especially disputes about 
the division of property may spill over and affect the determination of care and 
contact issues – as indeed frequently happens where children become pawns 
in a larger struggle. There are good reasons for opting for a position that 
aspects of a divorce decision regarding parental responsibilities and rights 
may be separated from other aspects.
However, as will become evident, the real question that arises is whether 
variations, terminations and suspensions of decisions relating to children 
made at divorce continue after the finalisation of the divorce order itself to be 
20 See the definitions section (section1).
21 Issue 521, F54 (Butterworth and Co).
22 Van Heerden et al.1999:510, 514-524 and 640-643.
23 For contrary (earlier) case law which insinuates that care matters need not 
necessarily form part of the decree of divorce, and that the divorce action can be 
disposed of and the care issues dealt with at a later stage, see Kastan v Kastan 
1985 (3) SA 236(C); Zorbas v Zorbas 1987 3 SA 436 (W); Ex Parte Critchfield 1999 
3 SA 132 (W).
24 De Jong and Kruger 2010.
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“matters arising there from”? The answer to this is crucial to the interpretation 
of the jurisdictional ambit of the RCAA, as such post-divorce variations are a 
frequent occurrence.
The JRCAA, too, seems to ‘divorce’ children from divorce: no mention 
is made at all of the consequences of divorce relating to children, such as 
assignment of parental responsibilities and rights, nor the all-important issue 
of guardianship. Possibly, we are supposed to infer that responsibility for 
children and their maintenance, care and contact are ‘questions arising’ from 
divorce – for this has always been the case in South African divorce law, albeit 
rather unsystematically. We have an entire court structure – maintenance 
courts, which are district courts and not regional courts – devoted to the very 
purpose of dealing with maintenance, including maintenance arising from 
divorce. But technically, jurisdiction for variation of care and contact orders 
(and guardianship) would lie with High Courts which were seized with the 
initial order as a rule;25 this position was standard before the introduction of 
jurisdictional competence to decide upon care, and contact was expressly 
extended to the children’s court by the Children’s Act.
Therefore, it would have been helpful to spell out precisely what is meant by 
“questions arising from divorce” in the JRCAA, especially as the Act postdates 
both the passage and the coming into operation of the Children’s Act’s new 
rules on parental responsibilities and rights.26 Moreover, the Children’s Act 
itself does not assist in resolving the issue as to whether the children’s court 
can vary care and contact orders previously part of a divorce order made 
by the High Court. Section 45(3), which deals with exclusive jurisdictional 
competence of High Courts and Divorce Courts (pending the establishment 
by an Act of Parliament of Family Courts) in the eight listed areas, is silent as 
to whether care and contact arrangements resulting from divorce are the sole 
purview of Divorce Courts and High Courts.
In theory, the Regional Court, which now (having the same divorce 
jurisdiction as the High Court) deals with divorce, need not also immediately 
deal with aspects of care and contact – and these could be referred to a 
children’s court for adjudication – provided that the children’s court involvement 
does not concern the allocation or restriction of guardianship, and deals only 
with the remaining aspects of care and contact. Likewise, as was envisaged, 
variation, rescission and termination of a previously granted care and contact 
order could be dealt with in the children’s court under previously quoted 
sections of the Children’s Act (e.g. section 28(1) deals with applications for 
termination, suspension, etc. of parental responsibilities and rights), as the 
SALRC clearly proposed. Hence, the prospect does exist of an articulation 
‘downwards’ between Regional Court and children’s court (i.e. the children’s 
court varying or amending interim care and contact orders previously given by 
a Regional Court).
25 Van Heerden et al.1999:640-643.
26 Certain sections came into operation on 1 July 2007, including most of the chapter 
on parental responsibilities and rights (Chapter 3).
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An unexpected result of the definition of a ‘divorce court’ in section 1 of 
the Children’s Act, which links the reference to a divorce court in the body of 
the legislation to the courts established under the Black Administration Act, is 
that those courts have been abolished with the promulgation of the JRCAA. 
Hence, where the JRCAA refers in section 9(5) to “a reference in any law 
to a ‘divorce court’” being deemed to be a reference to a court of a regional 
division, that phrase “reference in any law” cannot mean the references to 
divorce courts in the Children’s Act, as these no longer exist due to the coming 
into operation of the JRCAA. (It must be remembered that the geographical 
jurisdiction of the old black divorce courts differed markedly from the Regional 
Courts’ geographical jurisdiction, and the new civil regional courts are hence 
not the automatic successors of the former black divorce courts).
It must be pointed out, when considering the evidently confusing position 
that now prevails, that the JRCAA was passed at a time when the Children’s 
Act had already been completed, and was partly in operation. The Children’s 
Act is not mentioned at all in the JRCAA, despite the array of other statutes in 
the family law arena which do receive express mention. The failure to consider 
the interface with the Children’s Act leads to some of the consequences 
discussed next.
4. Guardianship: Which court has jurisdiction?
It is fairly trite that the standard version propagated in family law is that the High 
Court retained guardianship jurisdiction in the aftermath of the deliberations 
on the Children’s Act.27 This is clear from a plain reading of, for instance, 
section 24(1) which provides for the application to the High Court for an order 
granting guardianship of a child, from sections 22(7) and 45(3).28 It was also 
the deliberate result of interventions in Parliament from the Justice sector, as 
noted previously in this article. But is this still the case?
First, it is the reference to ‘a divorce court in divorce matters’ which 
gives rise to the potentially confusing position that such court may now be 
the Regional Court by virtue of section 29(1B) of the JRCAA, which confers 
jurisdiction in “divorce and matters arising there from”. Hence, when dealing 
with guardianship in a divorce action, which is almost inevitable insofar as 
guardianship is a component of parental responsibilities and rights, it seems 
that the JRCAA now confers jurisdiction on the Regional Court, thus overriding 
the earlier award of exclusive jurisdiction to the High Court in the Children’s 
27 See, for instance, Heaton 2007:3-9.
28 Even this seemingly clear position becomes a little murkier when regard is given to 
section 28 of the Children’s Act, which deals with termination, extension, suspension 
or restriction of parental responsibilities and rights. This latter application (by a co-
holder of parental responsibilities and rights, by any other person having a sufficient 
interest in the care, protection, well-being or development of the child; by the child in 
the child’s interest by any other person; by a family advocate or the representative 
of any organ of state (section 27(3)) may be made to a High Court, a divorce court 
in a divorce matter or a children’s court. Nowhere is it expressly stated that only a 
High Court may restrict or suspend guardianship. This has to be ‘read in’.
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Act. As to whether applications for termination, extension, suspension or 
restrictions upon guardianship arising from divorce now belong in the lower 
courts, specifically the Regional Court,29 it is submitted that the answer is 
affirmative, and that the intention of the JRCAA was precisely to move all 
aspects of divorce and its consequences to a lower level in the court structure, 
and thereby to create a parallel jurisdictional competence which would extend 
to all facets of the potential relief sought. Supporting this reasoning is the fact 
that there is no evident scope to transfer a matter from Regional Court to High 
Court, should the award of guardianship emerge as a contested issue on its 
own during the course of divorce proceedings instituted in the Regional Court.
Secondly, the question arises as to which court would enjoy jurisdiction in 
respect of guardianship where it is not incidental to divorce. It seems that the 
plain prescriptive language of the Children’s Act, coupled with the limitation of 
the JRCAA to “matters arising from divorce”, leaves no other interpretation than 
that the High Court retains exclusive jurisdiction. This would mean, for instance, 
that an application for guardianship of an HIV/Aids orphan, which is unlinked to 
divorce, must remain a High Court matter – i.e. the most expensive and least 
geographically accessible option.30 This is paradoxical to say the least.
Thirdly, the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court regarding guardianship31 
is unaltered by the recent statutory changes. Hence, it remains open to any 
party to approach the High Court on issues related to its inherent jurisdiction, 
which cannot be devolved upon mere ‘creatures of statute’, viz. the 
Regional Courts.
Four, the effect which conferring formerly High Court jurisdiction on a lower 
court has upon the established hierarchy is unclear. In Ntuli v Zulu 2005 1 SA 
45 (N) the court found that the black divorce courts which operated under the 
Administration Act had the status of inferior courts and, as such, proceedings 
held in these courts were subject to review by the High Court. Although the 
civil Regional Court, as referred to in the JRCAA, is not a direct successor 
to the black divorce courts, it may be so that decisions on guardianship, 
care or contact of the courts now imbued with jurisdiction by the JRCAA can 
29 The general view has been that the wording of section 28 of the Children’s Act allows 
variation of (e.g.) care and contact orders by a range of courts, which theoretically 
empowers a children’s court to interfere with a prior High Court order in which 
the details of care, residence, etc. were spelt out. Skelton (Boezaart 2010:83), for 
instance, argues that the section seems to offer a choice of forum, although she 
continues to advise that given the restrictive application of section 1(4) to matters 
arising from a divorce, which remain the jurisdiction of the High Court (in terms of 
the Children’s Act), the original court should be approached when variation, etc. is 
sought. Added to this insight, now, is the JRCAA which confers identical jurisdiction 
on the Regional Courts, so that her view must be supplemented with the further 
proviso that now a High Court order can be amended in the Regional Court (but 
probably not in the children’s court).
30 See Ex Parte Sibisi (case 2115/10 KZN High Court), unreported, which concerned an 
application for guardianship of an orphan. At paragraph 14 the court recommended 
legislative amendment to clarify the jurisdictional issues around guardianship.
31 See, in general, Van Heerden et al.1999:500-501.
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nevertheless be reviewed by a High Court, as well as (in addition to) being 
brought before High Courts on appeal.
5. When is the Regional Court to be a court of   
 first instance in family law matters, in contrast to the  
 children’s court, and specifically with respect to   
 parental responsibilities and rights?
One reading of the JRCAA entails that the Regional Court is a court of first 
instance when any aspect of parental rights and responsibilities is coupled 
to ‘a divorce action’. This seems to have been the intention of the legis- 
lature in expressly extending divorce jurisdiction, with ancillary relief, to 
Regional Courts.
So, too, it is arguable that a Regional Court may be approached in the 
first instance for the registration of a parenting plan (and possibly a parental 
responsibilities and rights agreement). Parenting plans, in particular, may 
arise as a postscript to divorce, where co-holders of parental responsibilities 
and rights are “experiencing difficulties in exercising their responsibilities and 
rights” (section 34(2) of the Children’s Act). The (Regional) court which had 
granted the divorce would undoubtedly be competent thereafter to permit 
variations of the order via a subsequent parenting plan.
However, neither section 34 of the Children’s Act nor regulations 7, 9 
and 10 nor the Forms refer expressly in this instance to a ‘divorce court’. 
While section 34 refers only to “a court”, regulation 7(3) mentions that 
where the allocation of guardianship occurs in a parental responsibility and 
rights agreement, the agreement must be made an order of the High Court; 
regulation 7(5) refers to filing of the agreement with the Family Advocate, 
children’s court or High Court. Regulation 9(3) is similarly worded in relation 
to filing of parenting plans. The competence of Regional Courts to register 
plans and agreements is thus insufficiently laid out in law. The question as to 
whether Regional Courts may be approached as registrars of first instance 
has considerable practical implications, as these courts will need to know 
whether the necessary filing and administrative systems are required to be 
established or not.
The above omissions arise from the fact that the model proposed by 
the SALRC was not adopted in the version of the Children’s Act adopted by 
Parliament; hence, it was not envisaged, at the time of drafting the regulations, 
that courts of regional stature would be involved in divorce litigation as courts 
of first instance. Therefore the new provisions enhancing the allocation and 
exercise of parental responsibilities and rights were not made applicable to 
Regional Courts.
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6. Hague abduction matters and relocation disputes
Hague abduction matters and relocation disputes have traditionally been 
the preserve of the High Courts. Relocation of a parent who is a holder of 
parental responsibilities and rights outside the borders of South Africa relates 
to “removal of the child from the Republic”, which is expressly an incidence 
of guardianship (section 18 of the Children’s Act), which makes this a High 
Court function. Hague abduction matters32 may or may not relate to a prior 
divorce, depending on the prior relationship between the disputing parents 
who have access rights that have been disturbed by the wrongful retention or 
abduction. Section 45(3) of the Children’s Act makes it clear, as mentioned, 
that “pending the establishment of family courts by an act of Parliament, High 
Courts and Divorce Courts have exclusive jurisdiction” over departure, removal 
and abduction issues. However, as noted earlier, the divorce courts alluded 
to in the Children’s Act are defined in section 1 as those courts established 
under the Administration Amendment Act 9 of 1929 which, in turn, have now 
been abolished. It is unclear, therefore, if the new jurisdiction of the Regional 
Courts extends to Hague matters and to removal/relocation applications. At 
face value, it would seem that it does not.
This view is supported by the text of the JRCAA, which fails to mention the 
Hague Convention and international child abduction, even though a reference 
is made to the applicability of the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act and 
the role of the Family Advocate in Regional Court divorces. This is potentially 
relevant as the body set up under this Act – the Office of the Family Advocate 
– is the custodian of the Hague Abduction Convention, and the Chief Family 
Advocate is the Central Authority designated under that Convention. The 
various offices of the Family Advocate have built up vast experience in 
pursuing and assisting with Hague claims since South Africa’s ratification of 
the treaty in 1997. But unless the JRCAA can be stretched to accommodate 
Hague abduction cases that arise from a prior divorce – for instance, a divorce 
previously dealt with in that same Regional Court acting as a court of first 
instance – it would appear that the exclusive preserve of the High Court in 
Hague cases remains untouched. Certainly, it would appear difficult to found 
Regional Court jurisdiction, given the lack of a reference to Hague matters in 
the JRCAA, given the express reference to High Court jurisdiction in chapter 
17 of the Children’s Act (the international child abduction chapter), and in 
view of the reality that Hague matters do not necessarily relate to divorce 
(e.g. when access rights of unmarried parents are at issue). Moreover, Hague 
jurisdiction may not even relate to a divorce that has occurred in this country. 
If, for instance, the divorce in respect of which a Hague application relates 
had been finalised in Germany or Canada, our High Courts would not have 
had jurisdiction ‘arising from divorce’ in the first place due to the usual laws of 
domicile, rendering it doubtful whether the JRCAA can then devolve that non-
existent jurisdiction to inferior courts (which are creatures of statute).
32 Matters concerning the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction, now incorporated domestically in Chapter 17 of the Children’s Act, 
and attached in full as a schedule to the Act.
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Relocation jurisdiction may also raise related problems. It is not 
inconceivable that relocation applications may arise between unmarried 
parents, who share parental responsibilities and rights as a result of either 
the automatic acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights in terms of 
section 21 of the Children’s Act, or as a result of an agreement concluded in 
terms of section 22 of this Act. Divorce is and was not an issue, and hence the 
jurisdiction of the Regional Court cannot arise. High Court jurisdiction remains 
the only option, according to the wording of the Children’s Act. Surrogacy, of 
course, is even less related to divorce and since Chapter 19 of the Children’s 
Act confers jurisdiction to approve surrogacy agreements only on High Courts, 
any potential role for Regional Courts cannot arise.
It is therefore submitted that the JRCAA did not intend to confer jurisdiction 
on Regional Courts in any of these matters, since it cannot logically be 
accepted that the Regional Court’s jurisdiction on international child abduction 
and relocation is reserved only for disputes involving the previously married. 
In addition, allocating different courts for the previously married and previously 
unmarried would constitute a clear violation of the constitutional right to non-
discrimination on the basis of marital status. Therefore, any Hague or relocation 
matter arising from a divorce, even if previously finalised in a Regional Court, 
may have to be set down in a High Court for adjudication.
7. The positive, the less positive and recommendations  
 for reform
It seems almost contradictory to complain that the largely lower court-based 
model envisaged by the SALRC has in fact almost come to fruition via the 
JRCAA, albeit rather unexpectedly, and by a route undebated by civil society. 
Hence, the major achievement of the JRCAA is that almost all family law 
matters must now be dealt with at regional and district court level, which is 
more affordable and geographically accessible than the High Court. This 
accommodates one key overarching aim of the law reform process, namely 
to render justice more accessible where children are concerned. In addition, 
the black divorce courts are a creature of the past, and have been abolished. 
Finally, the stillborn concept of pilot Family Courts, which did not make much 
progress in the decade of their existence, has finally been laid to rest. These 
three aspects of the JRCAA can be regarded as being positive.
However, a less positive feature of the JRCAA and the model it creates 
is that the vision is a partial one. For instance, there is clearly no articulation 
between the district children’s court and the Regional Court, as was envisaged 
by the SALRC for instances in which a more complicated issue emerges, or 
where an appeal is noted.33 Instead of articulation, two compartmentalised 
court structures, viz. children’s courts and Regional Courts, seem to be 
jurisdictionally competent in overlapping ways. The relationship between them 
is murky, at best.
33 SALRC Report on the Review of the Child Care Act (2002) paragraph 22.3.
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The articulation between the Regional Courts and the High Court is also 
somewhat illogical, as evidenced by the fact that the latter is, according to 
case law, a court of review of the former, as well as a court of appeal and, in 
some instances, a court of concurrent jurisdiction. That forum shopping may 
emerge is a distinct possibility.
The lack of clarity on guardianship has not been resolved in the wording of 
the JRCAA, and the Children’s Act’s evident distinction between ‘divorce courts’ 
(now defunct) and High Courts (in whose domain alone guardianship must fall) 
becomes ever more difficult to justify logically and consistently. Indeed, the 
JRCAA does not mention or refer to the provisions of the Children’s Act, which 
poses a great dilemma. Calls for amendment of the Children’s Act to clarify the 
guardianship provisions have already begun to emerge in the courts.34
It is less than optimal that the JRCAA fails to deal properly with all of 
the dimensions of family law practice – including parental responsibility 
and rights agreements, parenting plans, relocation disputes, Hague cases 
and surrogacy, to mention but a few. The JRCAA is premised solely on the 
aftermath of divorce, which shows a narrow understanding of family law, and 
negates the tremendous steps that have been taken in developing a more 
realistic understanding of ‘family’ which includes unmarried partners and other 
stakeholders in parental responsibilities and rights pertaining to children.35
Another facet of the JRCAA that represents a less positive dimension 
emerges from the way in which implementation has been dealt with. Some 
years ago a small cohort of magistrates were given family law training with 
the idea that they might become the family law/civil law specialists of the pilot 
Family Courts, as they then seemed to be developing. That training is long 
since of little use, and no additional training of substance has been noted. Even 
training on the Children’s Act for justice officials has been rather lacking, with 
few efforts having been made to prepare lower court officials for implementation 
even three years after the promulgation of the first parts of the Act.
The new arrangements in the JRCAA were put into operation on 9 August 
2010 without any ‘back up’ in the form of skilled personnel, training, or 
systems. Although Rules were finalised and promulgated in October 2010, 
most people were totally unaware of the widespread promulgation of the Act 
that was about to occur unexpectedly.36 Ultimately, family law academics, 
teachers and practitioners will all experience the JRCAA as disempowering: 
it negates years of good work (e.g. of the SALRC, the Parliamentary Portfolio 
Committee on Social Development that engaged with the Children’s Act 
and its Regulations, and so forth) that has gone into reshaping and 
harmonising family and child law processes.37 The main objective of the hasty 
34 See Ex parte Sibisi (note 30 above).
35 See, for instance, Sloth-Nielsen and Van Heerden 2003.
36 Discussion with a senior Justice Department Official, September 2010, who noted 
that during the last week of September, hasty arrangements were being made to 
send regional courts magistrates for training.
37 See Sloth-Nielsen and Du Toit 2008 for a collection of papers from the first 10 years 
of annual family law conferences convened among academics, practitioners, Family 
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implementation of the JRCAA without prior infrastructure, training and public 
preparation seems to have taken place due to the goal of enabling Regional 
Court magistrates to gain civil experience so that they qualify for judicial 
appointment. In the short term, this does a great disservice to family law and 
children caught up in legal processes.
The implementation of the JRCAA leaves a legacy of confusion, which 
will lead to a multitude of complications, not the least of which is working 
out what matters arising from divorce are now the preserve of the Regional 
Courts. Whereas the clear implication of the Children’s Act (section 28) is 
that variations, suspensions and terminations of parental responsibilities and 
rights arrangements can be dealt with at children’s court level, this might not 
actually happen. Children’s court magistrates, fearful of overstepping their 
statutory mandate, might decline to review parental responsibilities and rights 
allocations arising out of divorces previously granted by Regional Courts, on 
the grounds that only the hierarchically higher court has the competency to 
adjudicate. The wide powers awarded the children’s court, the most accessible 
forum for ordinary people, will then become dead letters.
It is therefore recommended that legislative reform is urgently required: 
article 1(4) of the Children’s Act must be deleted in its entirety, and the sections 
of the Children’s Act which reserve guardianship jurisdiction only for High 
Courts removed as having been superceded by the JRCAA. The references in 
the Children’s Act to a ‘divorce court’ are also now obsolete and can safely be 
deleted. In place of references to divorce courts, the Children’s Act can clarify 
that Regional Courts enjoy the same jurisdiction as High Courts, and spell 
out whether this extends to relocation issues as well as to Hague abduction 
applications. The JRCAA should also be amended to remove the phrase 
“matters arising from divorce” as part of the founding jurisdiction it purports 
to confer, and to explain how termination, variations and amendments of 
parental rights and responsibilities are to occur, as well as to provide for the 
jurisdiction of these courts where unmarried parents contest, for instance, 
guardianship. The regulations will need to be adapted to empower Regional 
Courts to register parenting plans, or at least indicate where parenting plans 
formulated during divorce proceedings in Regional Courts are supposed to 
be lodged.
Advocates and government officials to share practice and policy developments 
relating to child and family law.
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